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Thus the Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit decision. It ruled that the 
Port regulated trucking activities similar 
to those regulated by the FAAAA and 
that no exceptions to preemption applied. 
ATA prevailed on the issue of preemption 
as to the placard provision and the off-site 
parking plan provision in the concession 
agreement.  
ConCLUSIon
The lessons learned and implications 
for state and local governments are not 
as substantial, far reaching, or severe as 
some commentators had anticipated due 
to the narrowness of the Court’s deci-
sion and the lower courts’ resolution of 
numerous other issues that ATA did not 
appeal. 
Narrowly considered, the takeaway is 
that the FAAAA preempts provisions of 
state and local government agreements 
related to the price, route, or service of 
a motor carrier when those provisions 
impose criminal penalties. The Port over-
stepped its boundaries in its attempt to 
ensure that drayage companies entered 
into and adhered to provisions of the 
agreement that encroached on areas 
expressly reserved for the federal govern-
ment. It acted as a regulator subject to 
federal preemption when it threatened to 
use criminal sanctions.
The Court’s decision should not be 
read to prevent all local government ef-
forts toward improving air quality and 
port operations. The Clean Truck Pro-
gram has reportedly met with success 
while in effect. During the pendency of 
this case, the courts had enjoined the 
Port from implementing the provisions 
at issue because the courts had temporar-
ily enjoined them. However, even under 
a modified program, the Port reduced the 
rate of truck emissions by 70 percent, and 
the city received greater economic benefit 
from the program, at a lower implemen-
tation cost, than anticipated.  
Brenna elizabeth moorhead, aicp, is the founding attorney 
of Placemark law incorporated. the san Francisco-based 
firm provides general counsel services and advises real 
estate developers, investors, and property owners on real 
estate matters.
IntrodUCtIon 
As reported in last month’s issue of Plan-
ning & Environmental Law,1 on June 25, 
2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its 
long-anticipated decision in Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District,2 
ending the considerable speculation about 
what the Court would do after taking the 
case up for review.3 Writing for a five-justice 
majority, Associate Justice Alito held (1) 
that a government’s demand for money or 
land from a land use permit applicant must 
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satisfy the nexus and pro-
portionality requirements of 
the Court’s previous Nollan 
and Dolan4 decisions even 
when it denies the permit, 
and (2) the government’s 
demand for property from 
a land use permit applicant 
must satisfy these Nollan and 
Dolan requirements even if 
the demand is for money—
like impact fees, in-lieu 
fees, and other money exac-
tions—rather than a dedica-
tion of an interest in real 
property, like an easement. 
In holding that monetary 
exactions must satisfy the 
nexus and proportionality 
requirements of Nollan and 
Dolan, the court explained 
the required direct link 
between the government’s 
demand and a specific parcel 
of real property: the property 
interest is the landowner’s 
parcel for which government 
development permission is 
sought, not the character of 
the exaction as an interest in 





the dispute over efforts to protect the st. Johns river watershed has led 
to both clarity and questions in takings law.
real property, as many have urged and some 
lower courts have held.5 
While there has been much wringing 
of hands—particularly in the  environ-
mental community—over the cataclysmic 
change Koontz has supposedly made 
in the law of exactions and unconstitu-
tional conditions, Miami attorney Amy 
Boulris probably has it right: “Koontz did 
not change the law so much as protect 
it against nonsensical loopholes.”6 As 
Hawaii attorney Robert Thomas posted 
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on his Hawaii Land Use Law and Policy 
blog, “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the 
District’s proposed exactions did not 
go beyond what is roughly proportional 
to the impacts caused by Koontz’s pro-
posal.”7 Why, as Doug Kendall, president 
of the Constitutional Accountability 
Center, laments, is “[t]oday’s ruling . . . 
judicial activism at its worst?”8 Why will 
it “harm both property owners and state 
and local officials by injecting judges into 
the land-use planning process, making 
it more difficult for state and local of-
ficials to strike an appropriate balance 
between protecting the environment and 
promoting development?”9 The issues 
all boil down to one’s view of property 
development: a right to use private land 
subject to government regulation under 
the police power, or a privilege conferred 
by government. This is perhaps at the 
root of a post by New York University 
law professor Rick Hills: “I am not sure 
why governments should not be able to 
extract regulatory windfalls as well as in-
frastructure windfalls from developers.”10 
The key is that government has no right 
to do either. It has at least as much a 
duty to protect private property rights—a 
constitutional obligation11—as to protect 
the environment. The use of land is not 
a government-conferred privilege but a 
right, which government may regulate 
only in exercise of its police power when 
the health, safety, morals, and welfare 
of its constituent citizens are in danger. 
This also by and large answers Vermont 
Law School professor John Echeverria’s 
concern that deference to local govern-
ment mitigation requirements has been 
replaced by a burden of proof.12 
IMPLICAtIonS 
What the Court decided
Timing. After Koontz, state and local 
governments will obviously be required to 
consider both nexus and proportionality 
when placing conditions on land develop-
ment permits, whether such conditions re-
quire the dedication of interests in land or 
exactions of money. This is true whether the 
condition is precedent (agree to the condi-
tion or no permit) or subsequent (here’s 
your permit, but only on the following 
conditions). After all, this is the one hold-
ing upon which the Court was unanimous. 
University of Buffalo law professor Jessica 
Owley correctly observes that on this point 
the Court clearly got it right.13 How this 
will play out in practice may be another 
story. At least two senior commentators on 
the land use scene suggest either that state 
and local governments will simply stop 
negotiating entirely on land use permitting 
matters, or they will leave it to a landowner 
to offer sweeteners like workforce housing, 
oversized water and sewer pipes, and com-
munity recreational facilities to facilitate 
their permitting and rezoning requests.14 
The latter would convert the land develop-
ment permitting process to something akin 
to Virginia’s infamous “proffer” system, 
which virtually requires such offers.
Mitigation Fees. As the facts in this 
case deal with a mitigation fee and the 
Court specifically rejected the monetary 
versus real property interest distinction 
in applying Nollan and Dolan nexus and 
proportionality, the decision almost cer-
tainly applies to mitigation fees charged 
to ameliorate the environmental effects 
of a proposed land development proj-
ect. Proportionality in particular will 
be important here. We can logically 
expect more use of such fees in place of 
land parcel requirements because the 
former will be more easily constitution-
ally tailored to a development-driven 
need. Thus, for example, as Jessica Owley 
points out, where a landowner is convert-
ing two acres to dry land, the fee should 
compensate for no more than those two 
acres. Requiring a fee for the creation of 
a multiacre wetland park would almost 
certainly be disproportionate.15 
In-Lieu Fees. Clearly and most obviously, 
the nexus and proportionality requirements 
of Nollan and Dolan are now applicable to 
fees often charged by local government in 
lieu of a dedication of a property interest 
per se. The Court specifically singled out 
such in-lieu fees in its opinion.16 
Thus, for example, where local govern-
ment charges a road-building fee as a 
condition for approving a residential sub-
division rather than requiring dedication of 
road and street easements, the fee, like the 
easements, will have to bear a nexus to the 
need for roads generated by the subdivision, 
and the fee will have to be proportional to 
that generated need as well.  
Impact Fees. The decision by its terms 
also applies to impact fees imposed by gov-
ernment to pay for public facilities such as 
schools, public parks, and wastewater treat-
ment plants. There is no reasonable distinc-
tion between in-lieu fees, mitigation fees, 
and impact fees since all are fees charged by 
government as a condition for land develop-
ment approval (as distinguished from other 
charges such as user fees and taxes, discussed 
below). All are embraced by the Court’s 
term “monetary exaction”17 and thus all are 
now subject to nexus and proportionality 
requirements of Nollan and Dolan.
Other “Exactions” Versus Taxes and  
User Fees. The dissent makes much of the 
confusion between impact fees and property 
taxes or user fees that supposedly will result 
from the majority opinion.18 However, as 
the Court’s majority rightly observes, the 
two are fundamentally different and based 
on fundamentally different legal theories.19 
Land development conditions such as im-
pact fees and other monetary exactions find 
their authority and roots in governmental 
exercise of the police power. Property taxes, 
on the other hand, are rooted in govern-
mental authority to raise revenue—the 
power to tax, which requires no demonstra-
tion of nexus and proportionality to any 
activity by the taxpayer. User fees are merely 
charges on users for services rendered by 
the charging government (e.g., building 
permit fees). While it is always conceivable 
[government] has at least as much a duty to protect 
private property rights—a constitutional obligation— 
as to protect the environment. 
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that the decision could be interpreted as an 
attempt to apply intermediate scrutiny to 
all public finance decisions,20 as UCLA law 
professor Jonathan Zasloff observes in his 
incisive post on the Legal Planet blog, there 
has been no such broader scrutiny in the 27 
states that already use stricter, intermedi-
ate scrutiny for monetary exactions.21 The 
dissent is probably better read as a concern 
that the distinction cannot be made on the 
ground and that confusion will reign about 
whether taxes and fees are also subject to 
stricter scrutiny. On the other hand, per-
haps, as Zasloff further suggests, the dissent 
would like to subject all public finance to 
stricter scrutiny and is using the Koontz dis-
sent as a vehicle for commencing just that.22 
Indeed, New York University law professor 
Richard Epstein would apparently favor 
such heightened scrutiny, observing in a 
post on the Point of Law blog that “[t]here is 
no reason to keep the exaction/taxation line 
alive, and every reason to abandon a position 
. . . that taxes and fees are normally outside 
the scope of the takings.”23 
What the Court Probably decided
Mandatory Inclusionary Affordable 
or Workforce Housing Set-Asides. But 
what of the linkage of affordable and work-
force housing fees or minimum set-asides 
of such housing increasingly attached to 
land development permits of all kinds? 
Surely the provision of such housing is a 
public good and hardly any court in the 
country considers it anything but a govern-
mental public use or purpose also covered 
by a state or federal constitutional welfare 
clause. Nevertheless, because such fees are 
a form of exaction, they are subject to the 
“essential nexus” takings test under Nol-
lan.24 Even courts that have not expressly 
applied that test have nevertheless required 
government to show a proportional con-
nection between such a housing condition 
and the project upon which it is levied. An 
intermediate court of appeals in California 
so held, striking down an exorbitant hous-
ing fee levied on a residential project.25 
How to do it right is ably set out by an 
older Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion upholding a workforce housing exac-
tion on a commercial development project: 
Do a detailed study of the need for such 
housing generated by the project first.26 
Ripeness. Private landowners have long 
chafed under the Court’s two-pronged 
ripeness doctrine, which requires that tak-
ings challenges under the Fifth, and often 
Fourteenth, amendments first be “ripened” 
by exhausting most avenues of develop-
ment permissions and seeking compensa-
tion under state remedies before going to 
federal court.27 While under the ripeness 
doctrine it may still be difficult to bring a 
run-of-the-mill regulatory taking challenge 
(though the recent Horne28decision might 
have chipped away a bit there), it may very 
well be that the Koontz decision’s reliance 
on the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions may make it easier to bring Nollan 
and Dolan varieties of takings challenges. 
That is because, as property rights attorney 
David Breemer points out in the PLF Lib-
erty blog, all members of the Court appear 
to agree that a property owner challenging 
a permit denial under Nollan and Dolan can 
seek to invalidate the condition under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and 
seek damages under state or federal law, 
but not necessarily compensation under 
the Fifth Amendment.29 Since Williamson 
County hinges on the Just Compensation 
Clause, 30 if compensation is not an issue, 
then arguably neither is ripeness. 
What the Court did not decide
Legislatively Applied Land Develop-
ment Condition. The Koontz decision leaves 
unresolved a last major constitutional and 
land development conditions issue: whether 
an exaction legislatively applied is free from 
Nollan and Dolan nexus and proportionality 
scrutiny, as compared with a quasi-judicial, 
ad hoc, one-off exaction, which is presum-
ably not. While it is relatively well settled 
that the Nollan and Dolan analyses apply 
to exactions levied by adjudicative govern-
mental agencies on an ad hoc basis, there is 
a split of authority on whether to apply the 
tests to legislative determinations.31 In his 
dissent to the denial of certiorari in Parking 
Association of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 
Justice Thomas noted that “[t]he lower 
courts are in conflict over whether Tigard’s 
test for property regulation should be ap-
plied in cases where the alleged taking oc-
curs through an act of the legislature.”32 
Recall that in Dolan, where the Court 
added a second requirement to evaluating 
the constitutionality of governmental exac-
tions, it left unclear what distinction, if any, 
exists between adjudicative and legislative 
exactions. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in foot-
note eight, distinguished the Dolan case 
from Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.33 
“[h]ere, by contrast, the city made an adju-
dicative decision to condition petitioner’s 
application for a building permit on an 
individual parcel.”34 Another section of the 
opinion implies that the Nollan and Dolan 
analyses apply only to exactions arrived at 
by adjudicative decisions: 
The sorts of land use regulations 
discussed in the cases just cited, 
however, differ in two relevant 
particulars from the present case. 
First, they involved essentially leg-
islative determinations classifying 
entire areas of the city, whereas 
here the city made an adjudicative 
decision to condition petitioner’s 
application for a building permit 
on an individual parcel.35 
The Court did not conclusively settle 
the issue of whether legislative exactions 
are subject to Nollan and Dolan analy-
sis, but many courts have ruled that the 
Dolan test does not apply to legislative 
decisions.  
For instance, in Home Builders Associa-
tion of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that  
“[b]ecause the Scottsdale case involves a 
generally applicable legislative decision 
by the city, the court of appeals thought 
Dolan did not apply. We agree, though 
the question has not been settled by the 
Supreme Court.”36 The Supreme Court 
of Georgia adopted similar reasoning in 
rejecting a Dolan analysis of a legislatively 
enacted barrier and landscaping zoning 
requirement.37 In Krupp v. Breckenridge 
Sanitation District,38 the Supreme Court 
of Colorado also held that the Nollan and 
Dolan tests did not apply, because the 
impact fee exacted was based on legisla-
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tion.39 In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, the 
Supreme Court of California noted that:
It is not at all clear that the ratio-
nale (and the heightened stan-
dard of scrutiny) of Nollan and 
Dolan applies to cases in which 
the exaction takes the form of 
a generally applicable develop-
ment fee or assessment—cases in 
which the courts have deferred to 
legislative and political processes 
to formulate ‘public program[s] 
adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote 
the common good.’40 
Other jurisdictions, however, have ap-
plied the Nollan and Dolan tests in the 
context of legislative exactions. In Schultz 
v. City of Grants Pass, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals applied the Dolan test to a city or-
dinance requiring the dedication of rights-
of-way for street-widening purposes.41  
The court reasoned that: 
The character of the restriction 
remains the type that is subject 
to the analysis in Dolan. In draw-
ing its distinction between the 
legislative land use decisions that 
are entitled to a presumption of 
validity and the exactions that are 
not, the Supreme Court noted 
that what triggers the heightened 
scrutiny of exactions is the fact 
that they are ‘not simply a limita-
tion on the use’ to which an own-
er may put his or her property, 
but rather a requirement that the 
owner deed portions of the prop-
erty to the local government.42 
The Oregon Court of Appeals has 
subsequently applied Nollan and Dolan 
to legislative exactions.43 In Dakota, Min-
nesota & Eastern Railroad v. South Dakota, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of 
South Dakota considered a state statute 
that required railroad companies to dedi-
cate an easement in order to obtain devel-
opment permits.44 The court held that the 
legislative nature of the exaction “does not 
mean that a regulatory taking analysis is 
the wrong framework for this case.”45 The 
Supreme Court of Washington and the 
Illinois Court of Appeals have also applied 
the Nollan and Dolan tests to legislative 
exactions.46 In Town of Flower Mound v. 
Stafford Estates, the Texas Supreme Court 
suggested, without holding, that it also fa-
vors applying the Nollan and Dolan tests to 
legislatively imposed exactions:
We think the Town’s argument, 
and the few courts that have ac-
cepted it, make too much of the 
Supreme Court’s distinction in 
Dolan. By the same token, we 
need not risk error in the op-
posite direction by undertaking 
to describe here in the abstract 
whether the Dolan standard 
should apply to all ‘legislative’ 
exactions—whatever that really 
means—imposed as a condition 
of development.47 Justice Thomas, 
in his aforementioned dissent to 
the Court’s denial of certiorari 
in Parking Association of Georgia, 
questioned the legislative versus 
adjudicative distinction in the 
context of exactions:
It is hardly surprising that some 
courts have applied Tigard’s 
rough proportionality test even 
when considering a legislative 
enactment. It is not clear why 
the existence of a taking should 
turn on the type of governmen-
tal entity responsible for the 
taking. A city council can take 
property just as well as a plan-
ning commission can. Moreover, 
the general applicability of the 
ordinance should not be relevant 
in a takings analysis. . . . The 
distinction between sweeping 
legislative takings and particular-
ized administrative takings ap-
pears to be a distinction without 
a constitutional difference.48 
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
yet to decide whether legislative exactions 
should be analyzed under Nollan and 
Dolan, and lower courts remain in disagree-
ment over the issue.
The Remedy. Koontz may yet lose under 
application of Florida law to his particu-
lar circumstances. The court noted that 
Koontz’s damage claims depend on Florida 
law issues either not raised in the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari or not addressed by 
the Florida courts.49 
WHErE do WE go FroM HErE?
It is likely there will be more frequent use 
of the development agreement. Develop-
ment agreements are essentially statuto-
rily authorized agreements between local 
governments and landowners to guide a 
multiphase land development.50 Autho-
rized by statute in 13 states (most promi-
nently Hawaii and California), the devel-
opment agreement is designed in part to 
permit local government to require public 
facilities and improvements beyond those 
it may legally require as necessitated by a 
proposed land development project. For 
example, a local government could require 
adequate streets and parks to serve the 
projected residents of a land development 
project, but under the rules laid down by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Koontz, Nol-
lan, and Dolan, it could not require an 
expensive and lengthy bypass road to alle-
viate preexisting traffic conditions. Under 
a development agreement, it could do so. 
This is because the development agree-
ment is essentially a voluntary contractual 
arrangement, with each party—local 
government and landowner—receiving 
consideration for what it has given up. 
Nexus and proportionality are not rel-
evant. Widely used in California, the de-
velopment agreement has withstood legal 
challenges there that it authorizes the 
bargaining away of the police power or 
illegally binds future elected governments 
because the rights of the landowner to 
proceed with the development vest for a 
period of 10 to 20 years. More than 1,000 
of them have been successfully negoti-
ated.
It is also likely that we will see more 
care taken by local government to more 
closely tailor land development condi-
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tions such as impact fees, mitigation 
fees, and in-lieu fees, as well as property 
dedications, to the needs generated, or 
land use problems caused by, a proposed 
development project. Given the roots 
of such conditions in subdivision law, 
where landowners are rightly required 
to provide the roads, water, and sewers 
to service their proposed projects, this 
is a good thing. Such land development 
conditions were never meant to impose 
on the private land development com-
munity all manner of public facility, 
infrastructure, and housing burdens not 
of their making, simply because these all 
represent public goods and government 
somehow failed to provide them in the 
past, resulting in a current or prospec-
tive shortage of one kind or another. For 
these, government has alternate means of 
providing for such needs and shortfalls, 
such as revenue-raising taxes to which 
nexus and proportionality do not apply.
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